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THE AGE OF RIGHTS By Louis Henkin. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 220. $29.95. 
The United States was a leader in developing and promoting an 
international consensus that national governments should protect and 
guarantee the human rights of their citizens.1 In 1941, as the nation 
geared up for World War II, President Roosevelt declared as a na-
tional objective "a world founded upon four essential human free-
doms": freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, 
and freedom from fear.2 A more general understanding of human 
rights became a seriously accepted justification for America's full-scale 
participation in the war. 3 The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, borrowed heavily 
from the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights.4 In 
The Age of Rights, Professor Louis Henkin5 explains how the United 
States, by failing to join the primary international human rights agree-
ments and by failing to accept the existence of economic and social 
1. "For Americans - our common usurpation for the inhabitants of the United States - the 
idea of rights is an old friend, and we tend to think of it - with some arrogating exaggeration -
as our contribution to mankind." P. x; see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, Bibliographical Essay: 
The Influence of U.S. Constitutionalism Abroad, in CoNSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS 405 
(Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990). 
2. President's Address to Congress of Jan. 6, 1941, 87 CoNG. R.Ec. 44, 46-47 (1941). 
Roosevelt told Congress: 
The first is freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world. 
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the 
world. 
Id. 
The third is freedom from want ..•• 
The fourth is freedom from fear •..• 
3. "During the War, the Allied powers had proclaimed that assuring respect for human 
rights was their war aim." P. 1. The role of the United States as a defender of human rights 
during World War II is still recognized today: 
Twice in this century, the world has been threatened by catastrophe. Twice this catas· 
trophe was born in Europe, and twice you Americans along with others were called upon to 
save Europe, the whole world and yourselves .••. 
. • . [The U.S.] became the most powerful nation on earth, and it understood the respon· 
sibility that flowed from this. 
Vaclav Havel, Excerpts From Czech Chief's Address to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1990, at 
A14 (translation). 
4. See Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited 
Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1-4 (Adaman-
tia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979). 
5. University Professor Emeritus and Special Service Professor, Columbia University, and 
Chairman, Directorate, the Center for the Study of Human Rights. In addition to his academic 
career, Professor Henkin has served in the U.S. Department of State and for the United Nations. 
He is the author of several books, including: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(1972); How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1972); and THE RIGHTS OP 
MAN TODAY (1981). 
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rights as a matter of domestic policy, now trails much of the world in 
recognizing a full range of human rights. 
In this collection of essays and speeches published or presented 
over the past decade, Henkin provides a thorough and readable expla-
nation of how international rights developed and how they reflect our 
constitutional notions of individual rights. The Age of Rights does not 
present innovative arguments; rather, it provides a forum for Professor 
Henkin, a leading authority in the field of international human rights, 
to expound on the rights debate. As a collection of essays, however, 
the book suffers from certain structural problems. Throughout the 
book Henkin repeats arguments made in the earliest included essays 
- a necessary device for the individual pieces, but distracting to one 
reading the entire work. More seriously, the essays were published 
before the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the 
U.S.S.R. Although these occurrences may not challenge Henkin's 
conception of rights, they necessarily leave his analysis dated. 
In the first section, "International Human Rights," Henkin pro-
vides a philosophical and moral underpinning for his definition of in-
ternational human rights, places the relatively new concept in its 
historical context, and expands on several of the more difficult issues. 
While relatively uncontroversial, the essays in the first section are val-
uable as clear and authoritative analyses of the present status of 
human rights in the international legal system. 
International human rights are relatively new, legally and philo-
sophically. Henkin cites as their origin a psychological, moral, and 
political consensus, born out of the World War II experience, that the 
treatment of fellow human beings is a concern of "everyone, every-
where. "6 Human rights became part of the international legal struc-
ture through two postwar processes: incorporation into the 
constitutions of virtually all nations and codification into a series of 
international legal instruments, such as the Nuremburg Charter, the 
U.N. Charter, and the Universal Convention on Human Rights. This 
evolution of the concept of international human rights as a product of 
the consent of nations to international treaties results in some signifi-
cant differences between our views of domestic constitutional rights 
and of international rights. As Henkin writes, "for American consti-
tutionalism, the individual had natural rights before the Constitution, 
before government was established" (p. 144). By contrast, interna-
tional human rights, dependent upon the consent of national govern-
ments, cannot be said to "precede" government. Furthermore, 
international human rights are enumerated in several international in-
6. P. 16. Examples of concern for the human rights of individuals other than national citi-
zens do predate World War II. For instance, the international abolitionist movement was active 
as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, presumably out of concern for the human 
rights of Africans taken as slaves. P. 15. 
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struments; there has yet to develop a need for judicial interpretation to 
give them substance. 
In addition to offering a philosophical basis for international 
human rights, Henkin provides a detailed historical account of the 
evolving attitude of the U.S. government toward international human 
rights (Essay 5, pp. 65-80). In particular, he grants a behind-the-
scenes description of the conflicts within the State Department and 
between the Congress and the Executive Branch. He also briefly dis-
cusses several other international human rights issues, including: the 
lack of institutional remedies for international human rights violations 
(Essay 2, pp. 31-41 ); the rights of aliens and immigrants (Essay 3, pp. 
43-50 & Essay 8, pp. 127-40); and the problems of nonintervention 
and domestic jurisdiction (Essay 4, pp. 51-64). 
In the second group of essays, "Rights in the United States," Hen-
kin isolates two deep problems with our constitutional jurisprudence 
reflected in federal judicial decisionmaking, in congressional action, 
and even in law school teaching about the Constitution. 7 First, Hen-
kin argues that since the inception of judicial review courts have paid 
too much attention to the text of the Constitution, ignoring the under-
lying theory of rights that informed its creation. 8 Second, this overly 
textual approach functions poorly because the Constitution was not 
written to perform its modem role as "the constitution of a powerful 
national government largely subordinating state governments and it-
self governing the people" (p. 91). The Constitution is therefore a 
"congenitally flawed" document. It fails to provide adequate textual 
support for certain individual rights, leaving judges to find such pro-
tections in the imperfect Due Process Clause.9 
To compensate, Henkin attempts to revive the original Jeffersonian 
notion of "a constitution as social compact, retained rights, govern-
ment for agreed-upon purposes" (p. 91). He explains that, as a social 
agreement, the Constitution must be renewed, or readopted, by each 
generation. As a result, modem ideas about the federal government 
- such as its role in satisfying economic needs - should now be in-
corporated in our collective vision of constitutional rights. 
7. "Doubtless as the result of judicial neglect, law schools teach constitutional law as though 
the Constitution has no theory, and some students of the law may be surprised to learn - and 
some may deny - that it has one." P. 83. 
8. "We were condemned to be textualists, 'interpretivists'; other parts of our hagiography -
notably the Declaration of Independence - were excluded from the jurisprudential canon; an-
cestral theory might sneak in, but only occasionally, and in the guise of construction of the 
constitutional text." P. 91. 
9. Henkin has argued this point elsewhere: 
Except for the right to vote we have not added explicitly to the rights protected by the 
Constitution, but individual claims, imaginative counsel, and judicial exegesis have trans-
formed rights probably beyond what the framers of the Bill of Rights, and even the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, would have recognized. 
Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 96 (1990). 
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In the third and final group of essays, "Rights: Here and There," 
Henkin contrasts U.S. constitutional rights with international human 
rights. Although Americans tend to view human rights as intellectual 
and political products that we export to other nations, 10 there are clear 
differences in the substance oLU.S. and international rights. 11 These 
differences, according to Henkin, can be traced to their different con-
ceptual origins. 
International human rights are not a priori, and depend upon the 
consent of national governments; if governments refuse to recognize 
them, they cease to exist. As a result, Henkin sees a task of interna-
tional lawyers and politicians interested in human rights to promote 
the idea of national governmental responsibility for protecting human 
rights. He writes, "[t]he purpose of international political and legal 
preoccupation with human rights, and of recognizing their quality as 
rights of some order, is to help obtain for them the quality of legal 
rights in domestic societies and to enhance the likelihood that they 
will be enjoyed in fact" (p. 32). 
This emphasis on promoting the recognition of human rights belies 
a basic inconsistency in Henkin's scheme. On the one hand, he attrib-
utes to international human rights the same "weight" as domestic 
rights. At the same time, he is aware that the existence of interna-
tional human rights depends on governmental acceptance. Henkin 
never seems to resolve this inconsistency, resorting instead to a func-
tional approach, terming a potential entitlement a "right" only when it 
is helpful to his argument. 12 While this may be a necessary approach 
to what is essentially a developing body of legal thought, 13 it weakens 
10. See supra note 1. 
11. The distinctions Henkin considers most important, and describes most completely, are 
the fortunate lack of provisions in the Constitution for the suspension of its protections in time of 
emergency, and the unfortunate absences of a statement of equality and of protections against 
violations of the individual rights by other private individuals. See generally Essay 9, pp. 143-56. 
12. For instance, in discussing economic rights Henkin writes: 
Adequate food and other necessities, however, are surely fundamental, and essential to 
human dignity. The argument against treating them as rights was that they depended on 
available resources and large national policies and could not be enforced by the means avail-
able for enforcing civil-political rights. Treating them as rights, therefore, would only dilute 
international efforts to obtain respect for civil and political rights. 
P. 33 n.*. 
13. Some argue that fretting over this question is unnecessary because sufficient common 
ground exists among different political cultures regarding the basic core of human rights. See 
DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PoLmcs 182, 187-88 (2d ed. 1989). Hen-
kin seems willing to accept the philosophical ambiguity: 
[I]nternational discourse seems to see human rights in one or more of the following ways: 
a. as "goods," desiderata, that are not rights but that might be translated into legal rights 
in domestic or international law; 
b. as moral rights in an accepted moral order (or under some natural law), the individual 
having "claims" to freedoms and basic needs, seen perhaps as claims upon the moral order, 
or the universe, or God; 
c. as moral (or natural law) claims by every individual upon his society; or 
d. as legal claims upon his society under its constitutional system and law. 
P. 32. 
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the argument for full recognition of international human rights in two 
ways. 
First, Henkin's theory is susceptible to the frequent criticism that 
international human rights are essentially a Western concept, and 
therefore not applicable or acceptable to non-Western cultures that do 
not share a "rights tradition."14 Henkin addresses this criticism in the 
Epilogue, when discussing the problem of conflicting religious, polit-
ical, and moral systems. He concludes that all societies share some 
common ground: "[T]here is now a working consensus that every 
man and woman, between birth and death, counts, and has a claim to 
an irreducible core of integrity and dignity. In that consensus, in the 
world we have and are shaping, the idea of human rights is the essen-
tial idea" (p. 193). Although inspiring, this position dodges the argu-
ment that a "working consensus" is a description of agreement, rather 
than a reason for agreement, and therefore lacks persuasive value. 
Second, the disjunction between the theoretical underpinnings of 
domestic and international human rights weakens the book's most sig-
nificant and controversial position, Henkin's persistent and persuasive 
advocacy for the acceptance of economic and social rights in U.S. for-
eign policy and as U.S. constitutional rights. Henkin explains that 
economic rights are not a new concept in U.S. political debate. As 
early as 19'44, President Roosevelt spoke of an economic Bill of Rights 
in his State of the Union message: "In our day these economic truths 
have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, 
a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and pros-
perity can be established for all."15 Nevertheless, they have been re-
jected in both domestic constitutional law jurisprudence16 and U.S. 
14. See Polls & Schwab, supra note 4, at 14-15. 
Efforts to impose the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] as it currently stands not 
only reflect a moral chauvinism and ethnocentric bias but are also bound to fail •••• 
• • . If the notion of human rights is to be a viable universal concept it will be necessary to 
analyze the differing cultural and ideological conceptions of human rights and the impact of 
one on the other. 
15. Roosevelt continued: 
Among these are: 
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries, or shops or farms or mines 
of the Nation; 
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; 
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good 
health; 
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, 
and unemployment; 
The right to a good education. 
President's Message to Congress of Jan. 11, 1944, 90 CONG. REC. 55, 57 (1944). 
16. See Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q. 695; Martha H. Good, Freedom from Want: The Failure of United States Courts 
to Protect Subsistence Rights, 6 HUM. Rrs. Q. 335 (1984). 
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foreign policy.17 
The latter rejection is most clearly demonstrated by Congress' re-
fusal to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and 
Social Rights. As the only major Western nation not to accept this 
international agreement,18 the United States is hard pressed to assert 
its continued role as human rights standard bearer .. According to 
Henkin, the sources of the resistance to acceptance of the Covenant19 
include a devotion to representative democracy over satisfaction of 
human needs; strains of isolationism; and a belief that rights in the 
United States are satisfied more completely than in other nations, ex-
cusing the U.S. from its international obligations (p. 77). Opposition 
to the Covenant, according to Henkin, is an outdated position. 
Let there be no doubt. The United States is now a welfare state. Com-
mitment to some minimum levels of individual welfare may not be of 
constitutional rank but it is deeply, ineradicably imbedded in our na-
tional life. . . . To the world, moreover, whatever the United States does 
in fact, it does not proclaim a national commitment in principle to meet-
ing basic human needs. Americans are frequently reminded that our 
eighteenth-century philosophy, our kind of democracy, our national ha-
giography, show the United States committed to protecting property, but 
not to alleviating hunger, even of our own people. [p. 153] 
As with other arguments in the book, Henkin is persuasive and impas-
sioned in his defense of economic, social, and cultural rights. Unfortu-
nately, his argument for their domestic recognition reveals more about 
his perceptions of what should be our collective moral sensibilities 
than it does about traditional notions of "rights." It may therefore fail 
to persuade those who instinctively believe that economic rights just 
don't exist. 
Professor Henkin has long been an advocate for recognition and 
application of the concept of human rights. The Age of Rights, while 
offering little in the way of new arguments, and sometimes lacking in 
17. "It is true that the state must establish a legal framework which encourages fairness and 
prohibits fraud; but, having done so, the state must then get out of the way and permit individu-
als to live their own lives as they see fit." Ambassador Patricia M. Byrne, Statement to the Third 
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly (Nov. 9, 1988), quoted in Philip Alston, U.S. Ratifica-
tion of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New 
Strategy, 84 AM. J. INTL. L. 365, 374 (1990). 
18. As of January 1, 1990, 93 nations had become parties to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, yet the United States remains a holdout. RICHARD B. 
LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 180.25-180.26 (2d ed. 1990). 
19. Initially, some critics charged that joining the Covenant would unconstitutionally violate 
states' rights, interfere with congressional power, and affect matters of strictly domestic concern. 
Henkin dismisses these objections, writing that "[e]ach of these legal objections was long ago 
refuted." P. 76. 
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analysis of competing views, is a comprehensive and accessible presen-
tation of the views of a leading scholar in the field. 
- Stephen D. Sencer 
